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Abstract
The concept of legitimacy is examined (I) through a reading of
Habermas’s work on communicative action, and through a
reading of the opening chapters of Between Facts and Norms.
The claim that legal juries function in a manner similar to a
‘parliament’ is rejected in favour of a claim that they exercise a
decentred ‘particle’ of popular sovereignty. (II) An analysis of
the jury’s lifeworld origins is undertaken and, (III) the essay
then considers the democratic function of the operation of ‘jury
equity’ whereby juries may produce ‘perverse’ decisions, or as
described in the USA – jury ‘nullification’ whereby juries bring
in verdicts that go against overwhelming evidence  
Introduction
In his theory of modernity, Jürgen Habermas (1996, p. 40) makes reference
to the capacity of money and power to have a pernicious effect upon the
legitimacy of law, so that the legal sub-system ends up providing legal
justification for transactions secured by an illegitimate operation of the
economic and administrative systems ‘behind the backs’ of the citizens of a
society. This has important ramifications for democracy and its operational
effectiveness. If true it undermines the legitimacy of law and the authority
of the democratic state that underwrites its coercive power. It also throws
into question the operational effectiveness of metasocial mechanisms for the
‘self-legitimation’ of law which aim to be invulnerable to forms of strategic
and instrumental manipulation. This essay explores the question as to how
juries as direct, democratically constituted bodies, engaged in deliberative
communicative action aimed at achieving consensus, bolster legitimacy
within the common-law legal system. The idea is developed through a
reading of Habermas’s constructs of the ‘lifeworld’ and the ‘public sphere’
which are largely missing from the academic literature on legal juries
produced by jurists.  It is suggested there is ground to be gained in both
directions: for the theoretical understanding of juries and for the further
development of the understanding of the interaction between Habermas’s
concepts of ‘lifeworld’, public sphere and legitimacy. The exploration gives
ground for further study of the theoretical and practical issues surrounding
the use of citizens’ juries as direct deliberative democratic forms.  
(I) What is legitimacy according to Habermas and how is it constructed in
the legal context?
In its broadest sense legitimacy is concerned with the ‘rightness’ of a claim,
imperative or action. Legitimacy as an aspect of communicative action is
concerned with commands, orders and imperatives: it gives a speech act
authority which suggests it ought to be obeyed. In this sense it has a
‘normative’ aspect standing ‘behind’ the claim that it should be obeyed,
which suggests it can be justified by reference to universally applicable
norms. Norms in moral theory are universals and Habermas argues that in
the ‘postmetaphysical’ era when external validation cannot be sought from
an infallible divine source, norms must be legitimated by other means. 
Like rules, legitimacy can only have meaning within society: “to think
one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule…it is not possible to obey a rule
‘privately’: otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same
thing as obeying it” (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 81, cited by Habermas, 1987, p.
17 – 8).  Legitimacy only functions in a context of intersubjectivity
(Habermas, 1987, pp. 1 - 76).  Without language and its structuring of
subjectivity through the different linguistic relations of the pronouns ‘I’ and
‘me’ (and we) there could be no context of communicative action to enable
the making of ‘validity claims’ through statements asserting truth, rightness
or sincerity of expression. Without communicative action there could be no
context for dissension, which Habermas claims is operationalised through
communicative freedom and gives interlocutors the power to accept or reject
any claim. Habermas associates this freedom with the fundamentally non-
coercive nature of communicative action because validity claims are always
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open to rejection (Habermas, 1996, p. 119 and p. 127). Habermas weaves
subjectivity, intersubjectivity, language and claims to validity into
‘personhood’ but does not reduce this to a mere theory of ‘consciousness’
because he steers away from the individual towards an intersubjective
construction and finally towards objective processes of rationalisation and
systematisation.  Fundamental to the derivation of this intersubjective
legitimacy is Habermas’s theory of discourse.
Discourse and legitimacy
Discourse according to Habermas is governed by rules that underwrite its
basic logical coherence; normative rules that govern its reliability, such as
the rule requiring that speakers are sincere, and that they undertake to justify
their assertions or explain why they won’t, and rules that try to ‘protect’
discourse to ensure power cannot prevent the success of the ‘better
argument’. If operating, these rules “direct participants towards a rationally
motivated consensus” (Finlayson, 2005 p. 43 onwards).  The rules for the
‘ideal speech situation’ include that every subject has competence to speak;
everyone is allowed to question any assertion; everyone is allowed to
introduce any assertion; everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires
and needs and no speaker may be prevented, by internal or external
coercion, from exercising those rights. These rules are idealizing because they
direct speakers towards a rationally motivated consensus: “A discourse in
which the voices of all concerned are listened to, in which no argument is
arbitrarily excluded from consideration and in which only the force of the
better argument prevails, will, if successful, result in a consensus on the basis
of reasons acceptable to all” (Finlayson, 2005, Kindle, 36%, page 44 of 137,
Loc 934 of 2607). Whether or not the parties actually agree is not in fact
relevant provided they ‘could’ agree to the terms of the discussion. As
considered below this is problematic as the theory appears to rely upon a
‘universal’ norm that sets out the terms of discourse that leads the theory
back towards the problematic justification for the moral universal norms
mentioned above. 
In the legal and political context:
According to the discourse principle, just those norms deserve
to be valid that could meet with the approval of those
potentially affected, insofar as the latter participate in rational
discourses. Hence the desired political rights must guarantee
participation in all deliberative and decisional processes
relevant to legislation and must do so in a way that provides
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each person with equal chances to exercise the communicative
freedom to take a position on criticisable validity claims. Equal
opportunities for the political use of communicative freedoms
require a legally structured deliberative praxis in which the
discourse principle is applied. Just as communicative freedom
prior to any institutionalization refers to appropriate occasions
for the use of language oriented toward mutual understanding,
so also do political rights- in particular, entitlement to the public
use of communicative freedom- call for the legal
institutionalization of various forms of communication and the
implementation of democratic procedures. These are meant to
guarantee that all formally and procedurally correct outcomes
enjoy a presumption of legitimacy. (Habermas, 1996, p.127)
Hugh Baxter (2011) has claimed that Habermas’s ‘discourse principle’ is
inconsistent with his theory of procedural legitimacy: “Ultimately, the shift
to the procedural focus cannot save Habermas’s discourse principal.
Procedural norms are positive legal norms, and as such, they are within the
scope of the discourse principle” (Baxter, 2011 pp. 97-98). Being within the
scope of the discourse principle means they are tied to at least one norm –
that of the Discourse principle itself. Baxter claims that the democracy
principle – the discourse principle as applied to laws – still contains an
(impossible) universal element within it. “If procedure is to bear the weight
of legal and political legitimacy, then procedural norms, above all, would
have to qualify as legitimate. Given the discourse and democracy principles,
that seems to require that the legal norms that constitute and regulate the
democratic lawmaking process must themselves be capable of receiving the
citizenry’s universal assent” (Ibid.).  It is accepted here that it is difficult to
imagine how this could ever be realised. Perhaps in a ‘decentred’ modern
society in which all normative ‘agreement’ occurs, the ‘universal’ agreement
on the Discourse principle which clearly cannot be achieved ‘at once’ and
‘forever’ might better be regarded as ‘fractured’ and ‘parcelled out’
agreement that must accept the limitations of its own formation across time
and in a variety of locations. Whatever the solution, the problem will not be
solved here but it is acknowledged and it means that what follows must be
prefaced with a presumptive ‘If we accept the discourse principle then…”
When Habermas links communicative freedom to the right to
participate in rational discourses and connects both with political
deliberative and decisional processes, he envisages an ‘ideal’ set of
conditions in which discourse will take place. If this occurs – if the procedural
criteria of discourse are achieved – then what results from this discursive
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arena will be presumed to be legitimate. Habermas’s theory of legitimation is
based upon an ‘ideal speech situation’ that guarantees non-coercively the
success of the better argument, where “[u]nder conditions of ideal
deliberation ... ‘no force except that of the better argument is exercised’”
(Held, 2006, p. 238).  It is worth noting that David Held here quotes from
Habermas’s 1976 text Legitimation Crisis. In later texts Habermas revised his
position on force via a pragmatic political turn to the effect that if ‘force’ is to
be employed then reasons must be stated. Finlayson (2005) notes that by
Between Facts and Norms, Habermas has developed a democratic principle (D)
that specifies the necessary condition of the validity of action-norms that
holds also for legal and moral norms so that ‘Only those laws count as
legitimate to which all members of the legal community can assent in a
discursive process of legislation that has in turn been legally constituted’
(Habermas, 1996, p. 110). The coercibility of these norms does not rely upon
actual  agreement but only upon its ‘amenability to consensus’: “a norm is
legitimate only if all members of the legal community can assent to it, and
they can do so because it has been produced by a formal decision-making
body which incorporates deliberation and discourse, is open to input from
civil society, and conforms with legally instituted system of rights….The
democratic principle only implies that legitimate laws must merit the assent
of all members of the legal community; not that they must actually find it…
”; “Habermas’s theory of law, like his theory of morality, relies heavily on
this distinction between what is in principle amenable to assent, and what
in practice finds such assent” (Finlayson, 2005, Kindle, 75%, p.116 of 137,
Loc. 1960 of 2607). 
Law, Legality and Legitimacy
Legitimacy in its very broadest Habermasian sense concerns the rightness
of imperatives at the level of the individual speech act, or ‘command’, but it
is also phylogenetically related to the legitimacy claims of ‘law’ in the
juridical realm and ‘sovereignty’ in the political realm, the differences being
how legitimacy is achieved and enforced in each field. In the legal and
political realms the significance of legitimacy is that it carries with it coercive
force: the fact that coercion is employed to enforce legal and political
commands backed by norms, contrasts with communicative action, where
agreement is achieved intersubjectively and consensually. For Habermas the
absence of a metaphysical validation of law in the post-metaphysicial era
has given rise to a split between the facticity and normativity of law. This is
reflected in the division in the use of the terms ‘legality’ and ‘legitimacy’
(Habermas, 1988, pp. 97–100). Legality is found in the form of positive law
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and operates in accordance with clear and discoverable legal rules produced
within the context of a supportive state apparatus that claims legitimacy
from the operation of free and fair democratic processes. In what follows the
historical legal development of the jury system – its positive aspect – is not
considered, however it is taken that its legitimating capacity needs to be
understood in its legal context and this changes depending upon historical
and cultural factors. An Athenian style jury of male citizens or a colonial jury
that excluded the indigenous population would not be considered legitimate
in a modern liberal democracy. For an exploration of the pernicious
‘legitimacy’ of the colonial jury see Richard Vogler’s “The International
Development of the Jury: The Role of the British Empire” (2001; in Hans,
2006).
In the first chapter of Between Facts and Norms, Habermas sets out a
socially integrative role for law and addresses the problematic question of
how law can fulfil that function aimed at the stabilisation of society in the
post-metaphysical modern situation of “a predominantly secular society in
which normative orders must be maintained without metasocial guarantees”
(Habermas, 1996, p. 26).  He concludes “along with Parsons and Durkheim,”
that this stabilization cannot be effective simply on the basis of the
instrumental “reciprocal influence of self-interested actors”. Habermas
claims that purely instrumental and self-interested action does not have the
capacity to integrate and stabilise society without the intersubjective
influence of communicative action aimed at achieving consensus.  However
in a modern, diverse and pluralist society discursive non-coercive
communicative action alone is insufficient to achieve this integrative goal
when the archaic bonds and the “ties of sacred authorities” have been
loosened. A new kind of norm is required to fulfil the integrative challenge:
a norm capable of bringing about “willingness to comply simultaneously by
means of de facto constraint and legitimate validity” (Habermas, 1996, p.
27).  In effect Habermas is casting around for a norm that can re-unite
facticity with its normative validity to restore the authority lost by the
absence of divine assurance under conditions where the poles of action
oriented to success (instrumental action) and action oriented to
understanding (communicative action) have been driven apart to produce a
“perceived incompatibility of facticity and validity” (Habermas, 1996 p. 27,
italics in original).
Habermas found his solution, in a return to Kant’s Doctrine of Recht
and the system of rights “that lends to individual liberties the coercive force
of law” (Habermas, 1996 p. 27). This line of connection to individual rights
which justify coercive protection, is taken from The Metaphysics of
Morals/Doctrine of Recht. It offered Habermas a bridge to the ideals of
autonomy; private and public: “In the legal mode of validity, the facticity of
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the enforcement of law is intertwined with the legitimacy of a genesis of law
that claims to be rational because it guarantees liberty. The tension between
these two distinct moments of facticity and validity is thus intensified and
behaviourally operationalized” (Habermas, 1996, p. 28). As a consequence,
Habermas claims that the coercive aspect of law legitimised in this way
provides two possible performative attitudes that satisfy the demands of
both: 1) rationally choosing actors who expect enforcement and so comply -
for whom the law has de facto validity and 2) actors who want to reach
understanding and seek normative recognition with others - for whom the
law achieves normative legitimacy capable of inducing respect (Habermas,
1996, p. 31). 
Autonomy and legitimacy
In Habermas’s theory, autonomy remains a key legitimating concept for law
because law protects each citizen’s self-legislation as a private individual
(Kant’s morally autonomous Enlightened subject obeying the self-given
‘moral law’ within). It is that which Kant, in Habermas’s reading, calls upon
coercive power to defend and it is simultaneously that which for Habermas
will secure rule acceptance. The rules must be self-given and in a democracy
the laws must be written by those who live under them. This self-legislating
role requires at the very least the possibility of participation in political activity,
such as voting or standing for office, and has implications for the possible
legitimacy of laws passed by the representatives of the people under a
constitution (Habermas, 1996, p. 110).  However the democratic constitution
proposed by Habermas must function in the social condition of complexity
and ‘modernity’, in which illegitimate power relations based on ‘interest’
seek to inhibit and interfere with the mechanisms that provide democratic
legitimacy both to the state and its laws.  This situation is intensified under
a representative system where the citizen’s participation is reduced to
‘acclamation’ in elections. In the modern representative democracy it is
suggested that parties use the mass media to manipulate the electorate to
create an unthinking party allegiance, and in which system, voters are
effectively reduced to the condition of consumers (Habermas, 1991, p. 176).
The public sphere is denuded and the effect of organized interests turns
legislators into the agents or principles of parties (not simply ‘political
parties’ but also those of special-interest groups) (Calhoun, 1992, pp. 26-27).
The role of the state is vital to protect both private and public
autonomy against “the overpowering of the legal system by illegitimate
power relations that contradict its normative self-understanding”, but this
is difficult to achieve in a context where the system-steering and integrative
mechanisms of money and administrative power operate ‘behind the backs’
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of participants. 
[I]nstitutions of private and public law make possible the
establishment of markets and governmental bodies, because the
economic and the administrative system, which have separated
from the lifeworld, operate inside the forms of law….
Often enough, law provides illegitimate power with
the mere semblance of legitimacy. At first glance one cannot tell
whether legal regulations deserve the assent of associated
citizens or whether they result from administrative self-
programming and structural social power in such a way that
they independently generate the necessary mass loyalty.
The less the legal system as a whole can rely on
metasocial guarantees and immunize itself against criticism, the
less scope there is for this type of self-legitimation of law.
(Habermas, 1996, p. 40)
The above is quoted at length because it is precisely in this arena that the
role of the jury can be comprehended within the common-law legal
framework as a communicative and democratic mechanism for the
legitimation of law. But what does it mean to speak of any system as ‘self-
legitimating’? It requires that there should be a mechanism internal to a
system that accords it validity, in some senses as a formal constitution does
a state, or as a ‘procedure’ does in Habermas’s theory. Using this
construction, it is suggested here that the jury is a mechanism which works
in a similar fashion for the ‘uncodified’ common-law.
This is problematic however from a Habermasian perspective because
of the case-law basis of the common-law that appears uncertain, revocable
and endlessly amendable. If this revocation and amendment occurs in the
absence of a valid claim to legitimacy then the positivity of law “[forfeits] its
capacity for social integration” (Habermas, 1996, p. 38). Habermas leads the
search for law’s legitimacy back to its origin in the legislative process and as
a consequence the entire common-law, in Habermas’s system for
legitimating the law, appears undemocratic.  To understand why that is, we
need to consider what makes for a ‘legitimate’ legislative process for
Habermas, and this means considering ‘popular sovereignty.’
Modern democracies have decentred societies, where economic
action, typified as “the decentralized decisions of self-interested individuals
in morally neutralised spheres of action,” (Habermas, 1996, p. 83) relies upon
positive law to secure liberties by coercive means in order to permit it to ‘get
on with business’. The administration also needs positive law to enable it to
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manage its welfare responsibilities. Leaving open the motives for
compliance, “[t]hese laws draw their legitimacy from a legislative procedure
based for its part on the principle of popular sovereignty. The paradoxical
emergence of legitimacy out of legality must be explained by means of the
rights that secure for citizens the exercise of their political autonomy”
(Habermas, 1996, p. 83).  Additionally, democratic legislative procedure can
only draw its legitimating force from a process where citizens “reach an
understanding”. This process whereby citizens reach understanding upon
‘rights’ is the forging of ‘popular sovereignty’, but these two aspects give
rise to quite different political structures depending upon the emphasis
placed upon them. The liberal tradition structures its ideal State around
‘individual rights’, and the Republican tradition around ‘popular
sovereignty’. Habermas (1994) however tries to offer a procedural ‘third way’
that keeps both traditions in sight. 
The ‘third way’ proposed by Habermas in “Three Normative Models
of Democracy” introduces his discourse theory and takes elements from both
liberal and republican traditions and “integrates these in the concept of an
ideal procedure for deliberation and decision-making” (Habermas, 1994, p.
6).  This “proceduralist” method (Habermas, 1996, p. 135) triangulates
‘practical reason’ expressed in “the rules of discourse and forms of
argumentation” with both “universal human rights” and “the ethical
substance of a specific community”: “In the final analysis, the normative
content arises from the very structure of communicative actions” (Habermas,
1994, p. 6). Habermas suggests this ‘shift’ of the normative weight into
discourse makes for a better ‘fit’ with society and the state under the
condition of modernity. It offers a “constitutional answer to the question of
how the demanding communicative forms of democratic opinion-and will-
formation can be institutionalized” (Habermas, 1994, p. 7). The multiple
connections between state and “peripheral networks of the political public
sphere” thus reflects the decentred society of the complex postmetaphysicial
modern world (Habermas, 1994, p. 8).
The significance for legitimacy is that administrative power is
produced through a sluice of “a public use of reason and a communicative
power” (Habermas, 1994, p. 9) that feeds into and programs it. Public
opinion “worked up via democratic procedures, cannot ‘rule’ of itself but
can only point the use of administrative power in specific directions”
(Habermas, 1994, p. 9).  As a result “[d]eliberation is certainly supposed to
provide a medium for the more or less conscious integration of the legal
community,” as contrasted with a republican position where “the self-
organization of the legal community, is not at the disposal of the citizens in
any way” (Habermas, 1994, p. 9). Furthermore, “the only law that counts as
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legitimate is one that could be rationally accepted by all citizens in a
discursive process of opinion-and will-formation” (Habermas, 1996, p. 135).
Public opinion produces influence, influence produces
communicative power and via elections communicative power is
transformed into administrative power. This “suggests a new balance
between the three resources of money, administrative power, and solidarity,
from which modern societies meet their needs for integration” (Habermas,
1994, p. 8).  For Habermas this has a normative implication because “the
integrative force of ‘solidarity,’ which cannot be drawn solely from sources
of communicative action, should develop through widely expanded and
differentiated public spheres as well as through legally institutionalized
procedures of democratic deliberation and decision-making. It should gain
strength to hold its own against the two other mechanisms of social
integration – money and administrative power” (Habermas, 1994, p. 8). It is
precisely as ‘a legally instituted procedure of democratic deliberation and decision-
making’ in which all citizens can potentially participate that the jury
functions, and that is why the claim is made here that it is part of the
arrangement of mechanisms envisaged by Habermas as providing social
integration and legitimacy.  It is also this reading of the ‘separation’ of
democratic power between its ‘external’ legitimation by public opinion and
its manifestation in administrative acts that leads to the claim here that the
jury operates as a ‘public sphere’ as opposed to a ‘mini’ parliament exercising
legislative sovereignty in its own right. In this way it forms part of the “‘self’
of the self-organizing legal community” that “disappears in subjectless forms
of communication that regulate the flow of deliberations in such a way that
their fallible results enjoy the presumption of rationality.”  If this is not to be
an ‘exaggerated’ claim, no better in foundation than the rhetorical claims to
the value of the jury made by sympathetic common-law jurists, then
Habermas’s claim for the capacity of ‘procedure’ to legitimate must also hold
good. It is acknowledged here that that claim itself is problematic.  
The question of how successfully procedure legitimates law and how
law functions as a mechanism for social integration is challenged by John
Sitton (2003) in Habermas and Contemporary Society. Sitton offers criticisms of
Habermas’s theory from a Marxist perspective. He argues that the
lifeworld/system distinction “obscures our ability to grasp the extent to
which global capitalism is a political construction” (Sitton, 2003, p. 151).  In
his analysis the application of ‘law’ appears a weak alternative to political
praxis and analyses of power. Hugh Baxter (2011) in Habermas: The Discourse
Theory of Law and Democracy is also unpersuaded by Habermas’s distinction
between lifeworld and system (Baxter, 2011, pp. 97-98, p. 177). How
effectively the jury achieves or contributes to this process of integration will
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not be considered, nor how able the law is at countering the illegitimate
operation of money and power. This essay will focus upon elucidating how
it is possible to make the claim for the jury that it can contribute to this
process. The operation of money and power in society and the relations of
these systems to the legal system would need a comprehensive critique
which is not offered here, and it is acknowledged that any judgement upon
the democratic effectiveness of the jury would necessarily have to be
postponed until such a fuller account could be undertaken. 
Juries and autonomy
In the UK the jury operates within the common law and therefore is part of
the legal sub-system and yet its personnel are not of the system. The jury
exercises a form of autonomy within the system whereby the citizenry,
drawn directly and randomly from the lifeworld, act as a check upon the
development of the separate interests of law as a system per se because juries
cannot be compelled to their decisions by judges or any other personnel of
the legal sub-system. If illegitimate power is the province of money and
(administrative) power, and if the legal system is in danger of immunizing
itself against criticism (by its own internal mechanisms of self-justification
found in universalising theories of justice), overly pressurised as it is by “the
secular pressure of the functional imperatives of social reproduction”
(Habermas, 1996, p.40), then the jury might be considered an acceptable
democratic alternate mechanism for the self-legitimation of the legal system
which would then not depend entirely upon the elected legislature for its
legitimacy. The necessity for such an internal mechanism is understandable
in the context of the common-law system where law is not only the product
of Statute law made by the legislature, but is also found in cases and is
‘judge-made’. The jury is not external to the legal system; rather it sits in
court, determines the outcomes of cases and is involved directly in the
application of ‘common-law’ concepts derived from case-law.  It will be seen
below that for some commentators the jury should have no business with
the ‘law’ but should be restricted to acting as an instrument solely for the
determination of fact. However even this task is impossible in a common-
law court without the necessity for the jury to engage with ‘judge-made’ law.
For example, jurors must apply the mens rea concepts of ‘intent’ and
‘recklessness’ that are only defined in case-law and which the judge must
explain to the jury. In earlier incarnations the jury was also expected to rule
on the law (Gobert, 1997, pp. 35–45; Abramson, 1994, Ch. 2), and in this
capacity as source of validation, it is claimed here that it provides the law
with an alternate directly democratic and communicative internal
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mechanism for self-legitimation.  In 1649 the English radical Leveller John
Lilburne demanded jury trial on charges of treason against Cromwell.
Lilburne successfully defended himself, and won over the jury to acquit him
arguing that juries had the right to judge both the facts and the law
(Brailsford, 1983, p. 601). Lilburne faced down his judges with the claim:
“You that call yourselves judges of the law are no more but Norman
intruders; and indeed and in truth, if the jury please, are no more but ciphers
to pronounce their verdict” (Brailsford, 1983, p. 598; Gregg, 1961, p. 299).
Lilburne appeared to envisage the jury as exercising something akin to
popular sovereignty. 
The claim to the jury’s democratic legitimacy in the modern context is
founded upon the equal opportunity to participate in decision making
afforded by the jury system (Abramson, 1994, Ch. 3). In the context of a
parliamentary representative democracy the jury is not associated with
popular ‘sovereignty’ per se.  The jury works in an intersubjective and
communicative fashion in the Habermasian sense. It seeks to achieve a
consensus between participants in a uniquely constructed ideal speech
situation which complies with Habermas’s rules of discourse. Being drawn
randomly and directly from the lifeworld, with its autonomy protected by
statute and case-law, it is - in theory - rendered immune to the influence of
systemic power in the form of money or administrative power and also in
effect immune to the legal ‘system’ because its right to be the sole arbiter of
fact is protected: Bushell’s case 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).  Ideally the
random selection of jurors neutralises the influence of ‘interest’ because in a
diverse and pluralist society the jurors will present a cross-section of
interests. Seen in this way the jury becomes an ‘ideal’ self-legitimating
mechanism for the law as it endorses the law in its ‘factual’ nature as
determinative and coercive, yet it simultaneously dispenses validity and
acceptability in its role as defender of individual rights in court and in its
embodiment of civil public rights. The role of the jury throughout the history
of the common law system has been championed on these grounds.
This history and the claims made for the jury’s popular democratic
pedigree is often cited but seldom elaborated in a theoretical fashion by
common law jurists. Abramson (1994) is a typical example of a thoroughly
researched study that is rich in case-law and historical detail but largely
empty of theoretical analysis.  If however we analyse the role of the jury
through Habermas’s theory of legitimacy it offers a theoretical underpinning
that avoids the resort to ‘higher’ law or to ‘Justice’, or to the claim that the
jury operates beyond the reach of law in an entirely autonomous region of
its own in such a way that the ‘popular sovereign’ idea perhaps suggested
by Lilburne and also by Patrick Devlin (1956) who characterised the jury as
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a ‘mini-Parliament’ are revealed as overstatements.  From the elucidation of
Habermas’s theory of legitimacy above, the jury appears as a constituent
element within the legal sub-system with a claim to be a mechanism of
uncoerced self-legitimation. Uncoerced, in the sense that its deliberations and
conclusions are not under the control of money or administrative power even
though the condition of jury ‘service’ is itself coercively enforced albeit with
provisos permitting non-attendance in certain situations
II   How juries function as a type of self-legitimating mechanism within
the legal system.
Lord Thomas of Gresford: My Lords, I happened by coincidence to
be reading a summing-up on Sunday, and I shall quote what the judge
said to the jury. I think it is helpful to see how democratic principles
are applied to a jury... The judge said:
“You stand in between the state and the accused person. Trial
by one’s peers has a long history in our jurisprudence as being the
most tried and tested method of determining guilt or innocence of
one’s fellow citizens. It is an important right. Each of you will have
come to the court bringing with you all of your lifelong experiences,
coming from a cross-section of society, as to how people behave in our
society, as to what is acceptable and unacceptable, and, most
importantly, each of you brings with you, your innate common sense”.
Extract from Hansard: 20th March 2007 Col 1191 6.30pm : on the
second reading in the House of Lords of the Fraud (Trials
without Jury) Bill. 
The above quotation is very typical of observations on the advantages
of juries made by those who support the use of juries in the criminal justice
system. Juries fulfil not only a practical role as determiners of fact, but also
a symbolic role as representatives of the citizenry and arbiters of the mores
of the citizens. Cross-sectionality which is seen as so important from the
representational point of view, vies for prominence as justificatory
democratic ideal with that of the jury as a location of deliberative collective
reasoning. The call for impartiality and fairness as epitomised in the selection
process can overshadow the relevance of cross-sectionality itself for deliberation
(Abramson, 1994, Ch. 2; pp. 101-102, p. 140).
This section will explore how the concept of ‘lifeworld’ provides a
theoretical framework for the understanding of how juries operate and why
they are of particular value in relation to the deliberative process in the
criminal trial. While the role of the jury as a deliberating body has been
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explored by numerous empirical researchers, the theoretical grounding for
the ‘value’ of jury trials is not usually elucidated in any more than the most
general and vague normative terms as to what makes for a ‘good’
‘participatory’ democracy without situating this within the wider democratic
system. Why precisely should an ‘ordinary person’ be suited to the role of
juror? Why do you need more than one of them? And, why does a judge not
serve just as well instead?  
Schutz (1974) identified the lifeworld as “that province of reality
which the wide-awake and normal adult simply takes for granted in the
attitude of common sense”. It is the arena that is unproblematic (Schutz and
Luckmann, 1974, p. 3–4).  As part of this, individuals take for granted that
others are endowed with consciousness essentially the same as theirs. The
philosophical problem as to what constitutes the ‘real’ is de-problematised
as it is simply an assumption made in the ‘natural attitude’ that the world is
the same for others as it is for oneself (Schutz and Luckmann, 1989, Ch 6;
pp. 99-100). In this way the outer world of objects is ‘intersubjective’ as it is
brought into a “common frame of interpretation” (Schutz and Luckmann,
1974, p. 4). Individuals experience their lives within specific ‘situations’
(Habermas, 1987, p. 127): they relate to themselves by developing a memory
narrative involving these previous situations, and each life, although unique
to each individual, is also experienced alongside the lives of others in a
mediate ‘we’ relation as a result of a “general thesis of reciprocity of
perspectives” (Schutz and Luckmann, 1974, pp. 60-61).  This also leads to
potential for development of a typification of people (Schutz and Luckmann,
1974, pp. 68–92).
When considered in conjunction with the theory of communicative
action, juries in the context of intersubjectivity bring their entire lifeworld
experiences to bear upon the trial. Jurors sit together, they watch and listen
silently side by side on the jury benches, and (in theory) without discussion
during the case. At this point in the trial each juror is alone with their own
lifeworld experiences which help them to interpret what is put before them.
At the level of communicative action they must make decisions as to whether
they can take something as a fact, for example whether or not to believe that
an eyewitness was correct when they identified the defendant in an identity
parade although their initial sight of the defendant during the offence was
in limited light and for a short duration – they are being asked in this
instance to agree or disagree with an assertion that might be characterised
as ‘true’ or ‘false’ and to help them with this they will draw upon their own
experience of meeting someone at night, or their ‘general knowledge’ of how
hard it is to recognise someone after only a brief encounter, or even the now
widely publicised unreliability of eye-witness accounts. Likewise when a
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defendant claims they acted in self-defence and the judge has explained that
the law requires the defendant to have been both justified in using force in
the circumstances and to have used only reasonable force in those
circumstances, a juror is considering a claim to justification that requires
them to assess the ‘rightness’ (the legitimacy or illegitimacy) of the action
taken, and to do this again they must rely upon general knowledge that will
suggest whether they or ‘most people’, or a confident fit man of 40 with a
height of 6’5”, would feel threatened by his girlfriend screaming at him so
that he had to grab her round the neck to stop her hitting him.  And finally
although by no means least, the jury, by virtue of the necessity to ascertain
the facts, will have to assess the ‘truthfulness’ of all the witnesses and in this,
perhaps in more than any other area, it is clear that juries bring their life
skills (and potentially their prejudices) in ‘reading’ people to bear. Research
shows that jurors continue to watch participants in ‘off-stage’ moments too
(Rose, Seidman Diamond, and Baker, 2009). So, it is clear that juries are
engaged in a ‘situation’ that requires ‘life-world’ general knowledge and
they also practice all three varieties of communicative action. Each has the
communicative freedom to accept or reject the validity claims presented, yet
together they share the purpose of arriving at a consensus in the process of
deliberation. 
In reaching an agreement on the verdict under the supposedly ‘ideal’
speech situation of the jury room, a jury in England and Wales has two hours
to achieve unanimity, much longer to achieve a majority, but if they cannot
achieve agreement, then as a ‘hung’ jury that has failed in its task it will be
discharged and a fresh trial commenced with another jury. Some
experiments have been undertaken in the USA enabling jurors to deliberate
during the course of the trial rather than restricting deliberation to the end. This
research was undertaken to see whether it helped juries cope with extensive
and complex evidence notable in fraud trials (Seidman Diamond, Vidmar,
Rose, Ellis, and Murphy, 2003, 2006). Despite the occasional high profile
disaster, such as the Vicky Pryce case (Rozenberg, 2013a, 2013b), the jury is
an extremely efficient mechanism to reach consensus. In only 0.6% of jury
trials in the UK are juries unable to achieve a conclusive unanimous or
majority decision (Thomas, 2013, Crim. L.R. 6, 483-503; citing herself 2010,
at fn. 49).  The variety of crime ‘situations’ is effectively infinite; a diversity
of facts, individuals, and varying strengths of evidence that it is almost
impossible to imagine an ‘expert’ who could confidently undertake the
complex judgements that jurors make if he or she had to undertake the same
alone and without the subsequent assistance gained though discussion with
others.  The ‘ideal’ speech situation of the jury room deliberation envisages
a group engaged in seeking a unified (public) consensus without concern
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for their individual or group ‘personal’ interests. This may seem an
idealistically tall order, but empirical researchers note that for the most part
juries do succeed in this task because, as noted above, the number of ‘hung’
juries is small. This is particularly so in the UK where the majority verdict is
permitted in criminal trials after a minimum period of two hours (The
Criminal Justice Act 1967 c.80 s.13 as incorporated into The Juries Act 1974
c.23 s.17). 
Experts and laypersons
Every normal adult is in full possession of general knowledge.
The individual differences in general knowledge are only
minor: in any case they have hardly any social relevance. Every
normal adult can be considered typically to be highly
competent. Further since only a relatively limited portion of the
social stock of knowledge consists of special knowledge, all
problems which have the status of being able ‘in principle’ to
be mastered are also typically mastered by everyone. The
lifeworldly reality is relatively easy for everyone to survey...
Only rarely in the routine of life do problem situations arise in
which the factor of being a layman is prominent. Therefore
competence in general knowledge must play a predominant
role in the apprehension of oneself.  (Schutz and Luckmann,
1974, p. 325)
There are many criticisms that can be levelled at the assertions in this
passage and certainly contemporary social theory which emphasises
difference and the cross-roads nature of subjectivity and identity would take
issue with the notion of ‘generality’ per se and the resort to ‘normalcy’ as a
guide to likely generality. That every normal adult is in ‘full possession’ of
general knowledge or that the differences between adults are negligible is
certainly doubtful, and Schutz elsewhere admits as much: “Everyone, that
is, every normal adult, knows that his knowledge is not ‘complete’, and he
knows some things better than others. This consciousness of not knowing,
and knowing the varying quality, is the basic correlate of the social
distribution of knowledge” (Schutz and Luckmann, 1974, p. 320).  In relation
to the role of a jury it is precisely the mixture and diversity of the generality
of knowledge and individual specialisms (which will be found in jurors as
much as in any other section of the public) that fits the jury precisely for the
job they do. 
It is arguable that it is precisely in the ‘rare’ occurrence of the ‘problem
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situation’ of a crime and the existence of disputed versions of this that the
factor of being a lay person is ‘prominent’, so that in this instance the lay
person is unusually the ‘expert’. In the special case of the jury it is clear that
a ‘single’ lay person expert would be unsuited to the task of utilising their
general knowledge because ‘general knowledge’ as it is found in any
individual will be incomplete. As Schutz observes, despite the generality of
knowledge, not everyone is introduced to the same general knowledge, but
“rather learns the version belonging to the class into which he was born”
(Schutz and Luckmann, 1974, p. 326) so that knowledge acquired throughout
a life will be differently acquired between individuals dependent upon the
social circumstances of their acquisition of that knowledge. The socialization
of individuals in their subjective acquisition of general knowledge is
essentially individual in nature, and access to different ‘general’ knowledge
depends on the social structure and its stratums. 
No individual can access ‘general knowledge’ in an unproblematic
fashion on their own, and the necessity of communal agreement upon its
contents becomes necessary if the term is to have any meaning at all.
‘General’ knowledge only coalesces into an identifiable object through the
agreement between parties to a discussion – it has no other way of
instantiation. It might be said that general knowledge is not ‘general’ as such
but coalesces in a specific instantiation, such that the statement “a person
would take off her coat if the sun were shining and it was a hot day in the
absence of any other reasons not to” remains a simple assertion in the
absence of intersubjective agreement to acknowledge its claim to validity as
a general proposition. Once it has received this ‘agreement’ it could then be
identified as ‘general knowledge’. It is by nature intersubjective and
discursive which is why a ‘jury’ (just as a group of friends together talking)
becomes an ‘expert’ at its instantiation.   
This unstable non-rational, non-systematized ‘lifeworld’ element is
criticised by both positivist and realist legal theorists who see impartiality
and certainty as keys to a Justice that is denied by the unpredictability of
juries and ‘creative’ wayward judges using dubious methods of
‘distinguishing’ to get out of following previous case-law (see Lord Reid in
R v National Insurance Comrs, Ex pp Hudson [1972] AC 944, 966 quoted by
Lord Hoffmann in A v Hoare [2008] UKHL 6 at para. 20). These elements are
inveighed against as dangerously ‘arbitrary’ and anathematic to law both as
system and as a mechanism for doing justice by stabilising expectations
because it permits within law a mechanism for creating exceptions. 
This process appears to hand the jury, along with autonomy, a form of
popular sovereignty dressed up with the personality of the demos. This is
clearly an inflated claim and sounds like the univocal and impersonal
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‘People’ of totalitarian states. See Habermas’s reference to the ‘plebiscitary-
acclamatory’ form of ‘regimented public sphere’ (Habermas, 1991, preface
p. xviii).  It resembles the extreme end of a Republican reading that regards
as possible the unification of citizens under a form of general will. A
transcendental ‘demos’ does not reflect the discursive and intersubjective
nature of the jury.  Neither does the aggregation of individual positions
supposed by Liberalism offer a plausible description of the jury’s capacity
for reaching unanimous agreement. While it is evident that the jury in this
analysis draws on its life-world origins to justify its autonomy (to decide
independently of outside influence the facts of a case), its manifestation of a
form of ‘public autonomy’ needs further elaboration. This can be done by
locating the jury in the realm of the public sphere. The jury has in its origins
(from its historical restriction to those with property) a bourgeois pedigree.
This property requirement was finally only abolished in 1972: the Criminal
Justice Act 1972 c.71 consolidated in the Juries Act 1974 c.23 (Gobert, 1997,
p. 115-6). Gobert observes that a similar movement happened around the
same time to ‘re-classify’ offences in such a way as to send more people to
the Magistrates’ Court and so away from the jury. Gobert sees this as
Parliament’s ‘sabotage’ of its own democratic reforms that only around 2%
of criminal cases end up in the Crown Court where juries sit. This figure has
not changed in the years since Gobert made this observation. Over 90% of
all criminal cases in England and Wales are heard entirely in the Magistrates’
Court (MoJ, 2013) Further research would be required to substantiate
whether there are grounds to speculate that the erosion of confidence in the
jury runs in parallel with the historical deterioration of the bourgeois public
sphere traced by Habermas in his early work. That the limitation of the role
of the jury has occurred simultaneously with its ‘democratisation’ warrants
further examination. It may be that the ‘autonomy’ of the jury, its
‘permission’ to act as sovereign, was initially sanctioned by its early class
(and gender) credentials. In this respect the jury has some claim to be
considered as a constituent part of the ‘bourgeois’ public sphere described
by Habermas. 
To see the jury as a public sphere brings with it the powerful criticisms
that have been levelled at this concept. Nancy Fraser (1992) has criticised the
Habermasian ‘ideal’ public sphere as of weak democratic value given its
original historical limitation to bourgeois white men, and that even where
drawn from a wider plethora of groups in modern society the public sphere
is incapable of ‘bracketing out’ the disparities of social inequalities between
interlocutors. She argues that the idea of ‘bracketing out’ is a typically liberal
solution:
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Liberal political theory assumes that it is possible to organize a
democratic form of political life on the basis of socioeconomic
and sociosexual structures that generate systemic inequalities…
[T]he problem becomes…how to insulate political processes
from what are considered to be non-political or prepolitical
processes, those characteristic, for example, of the economy, the
family, and informal everyday life. (Fraser, 1992, p. 121)
She cites the analysis of Jane Mansbridge; “the transformation of ‘I’ into ‘we’
brought about through political deliberation can easily mask subtle forms
of control…. Subordinate groups sometimes cannot find the right voice or
words to express their thoughts, and when they do, they discover they are
not heard” (Fraser, 1991, p. 119). While the concept can be revitalised by a
re-reading of the idea of the public sphere as made up of numerous and
overlapping spheres, this also returns the idea of ‘interest’ into the public
sphere and as such it becomes a potentially fractured space of moral and
political disunity as opposed to an arena for the achievement of consensus.
The experience of the inability to find juries that will ‘bracket out’ social and
sexual differences in the context of racially segregated and patriarchal
societies has dogged analysis of the jury system in both the USA and the UK.
Jeffrey Abramson (1994, pp. 108-118) offers numerous examples of racial bias
evident in jury empanelment and deliberations in the USA. For what it may
be worth, although there is great concern in the USA for the way in which
race is treated in their criminal justice system, empirical research carried out
in the UK has concluded that in the British context juries do not appear to
discriminate on the grounds of race (Thomas, 2010, p. ii).  This can be
contrasted with the public debate in the USA over the acquittal of the man
accused of killing Trayvon Martin: see Charles M. Blow (2013). 
III The operation of ‘jury equity’ in decisions that reject overwhelming
evidence
E.P. Thompson in “Writing by Candlelight” (1980)
The English common law rests upon a bargain between the Law and
the People. The jury box is where people come into the court; the judge
watches them and the jury watches back. A jury is the place where the
bargain is struck. The jury attends in judgment, not only upon the
accused, but also upon the justice and humanity of the law.... (Auld,
quoting Thompson, 2001, Ch.5, para. 99)
Despite this quotation from E. P. Thompson, in the paragraphs that
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followed Lord Justice Auld in his Review of the Criminal Courts of England and
Wales (the Auld Review) spoke out strongly against the capacity of juries to
bring in perverse verdicts, which fly in the face of overwhelming evidence.
Against this view, Lord Denning had criticised the pejorative use of the term
‘perverse’ verdict as ‘impertinent’ (Gobert, 1997, p. 63). Unpersuaded by the
rhetoric of those such as Devlin (1956) or Denning, Auld weighed in heavily
on the side of those who say it is no business of the jury to go changing the
law by means of nullification (Auld, 2001, Ch.5, para 105). Auld wanted
jurors to be legally required to rule on the basis of evidence. For an opposed
position to Auld see Michael Zander (2005, p. 14, fn. 21). Auld stated that
Juries are not as Devlin claimed a ‘mini’ parliament and that they have no
business acting like one when acting as ‘finders of fact’ in criminal tribunals.
While Lord Justice Auld’s position is a respected one held by many within
the English legal system, it fails to consider those theories of participatory
democracy in which this action of juries might be found to be legitimate
upon acceptable theoretical grounds. However, the use of the word
‘parliament’ confuses the process of nullification with legislation and so
misrepresents the effect of jury ‘nullification’. No laws are cancelled by jury
nullification, the same law remains in force after the decision and even in
respect of that decision there remain avenues of appeal which lie entirely
under the jurisdiction of a professional (and in the UK non-elected) judiciary.
A mere jury decision in a trial court of first instance is no precedent for any
court to follow and thus it does not and cannot produce a substantive
‘common law’. The only ‘precedent’ set is the continued possibility for such
decisions by juries in future, and that is an already existing precedent of long
standing in the English common law: see Bushell’s Case (1670) which was
itself the result of an appeal court decision sanctioned by a judge in a higher
court. In some instances juries’ refusals to apply laws they disliked led to
subsequent repeals of legislation, which rather argues for the legitimacy of
the nullification process than otherwise. Laws, from those punishing people
who aided and abetted escaping slaves, to prohibition, to the extensive use
of the death penalty in England produced regular ‘nullification’ verdicts by
juries and as such contributed to movements that led to formal changes in
the law by the legislature. See nullification used by juries against The
Fugitive Slave Act in Abramson (1994, pp. 77–85) and Gobert (1997, pp. 33–
35). Rather than view this as ‘illegitimate’ it might be better understood as a
mechanism whereby the citizen ‘influences’ the legislative process. The jury
in this context can be seen as ‘jurisgenerative’. Jurisgenerative communicative
power, that no one is able to ‘possess’, underlies the administrative power
of government. It operates as a form of political power: Habermas takes the
following from Arendt; “Power springs up between men when they act
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together, and it vanishes the moment they disperse”.  This is axiomatic for
the ‘power’ operationalised by the jury (Habermas, 1996, p. 147). In this light,
nullification is the exercise of communicative freedom; it allows for the
emergence of political power rather than the exercise of an already constituted
power (Habermas, 1996, p. 149).  In this sense if there is ‘sovereignty’
exercised by juries then it resembles the idealised dispersed sovereignty
which Habermas claims is appropriate to the modern decentred state. In
“Popular Sovereignty as Procedure” (1988), Habermas sees the need for
sovereignty to be proceduralized and fractured, dispersed throughout
society – so that it is “parcelled out over many stages: the process of
proceduralized opinion-and will-formation must break down into numerous
smaller particles. It must be shown that political morality is exacted only in
small increments” (Habermas, 1996, p. 487). This ‘particle theory’ of
sovereignty described by Habermas offers a more fitting metaphor for the
jury’s exercise of popular sovereignty, saving it from the hyperbole of both
advocates and opponents alike.
If the above interpretation is accepted then it is clear that juries do not
‘legislate’ even when they make the implementation of a law ineffective. The
jury might be said in these contexts to ‘dis-approve’ a law. This will raise the
legitimacy of the law in question as a matter for subsequent debate and
consideration by the legislature. This interpretation saves juries from the
otherwise dubious claim to a form of “sovereign normless decisionism”
which would allow for the “free rule of the exception”, in an apparently
normless law reminiscent of Carl Schmitt’s decisionism 
(Scheuerman, 1994, p. 40, pp. 68-80).  Juries, however, do not single-
handedly decide upon the legal or moral norms reflected in law, but they
bring them back into the public sphere for re-consideration. In this way juries
make the ‘legitimacy’/‘legality’ separation recognisable and bring the
legitimacy of a specific law again into processes of deliberation in the public
sphere.
One possible solution to the ‘perversity’ of juries might be to force them
to abide by their oaths to try the case on the evidence alone, which Lord
Justice Auld did suggest.  Yet there are numerous ‘old’ cases where juries in
delivering their judgements, in the days in England when they provided
reasons for these, were very careful to word them with ‘lawyerly’ economy.
There were several attempts by the jury in Bushell’s case 1670. Initially they
returned a verdict worded “Guilty of speaking in Gracechurch street”. After
being bullied, locked up and threatened by the judge, they finally bit the
bullet and returned ‘not guilty verdicts’, for which the judge fined them for
bringing in a verdict contrary to the evidence (Abramson, 1994, pp. 68-73).
Quite apart from the practical difficulties of Justice Auld’s suggestion, there
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is some justification to say it would be unacceptable to force jurors to abide
by their oath if their autonomy is to be taken seriously. 
Historically jurors were called upon to deliver verdicts according to
their conscience, not merely in line with evidence (Gobert, 1997, p. 18-19).
The old law of ‘conscience’ can be closely associated with the idea of
autonomy. To require jurors to go against their ‘consciences’ is to remove
their autonomy in an unacceptable fashion when a matter seems not a matter
of mere ‘legality’ but goes to the heart of ‘legitimacy’. This would be when
the law in question, or its application to the facts before them, provokes the
question as to whether its brute application is justified, whether it is ‘right’.
In the case of Clive Ponting the judge told the jury that the ‘interest of the
State’ was equivalent in our Parliamentary democracy, to the ‘interest of the
government of the day’ and that Ponting had ‘no defence’ when he disclosed
information about the sinking of the General Belgrano to an elected Member
of Parliament for the opposition. The jury acquitted and rejected the judge’s
‘correct’ elucidation of the law that Ponting had no defence and they must
convict. The jury’s acquittal appeared to endorse a much broader view of
‘the interest of the state’ and its constituent personnel. The judge relied in
his argument upon the ‘fact’ of elections (and inevitably by implication the
constitutional import of the operation of the Parliamentary version of
sovereignty as being an effective majority in the House of Commons) to
underwrite his argument that “[i]nterests of the state, I direct you, means
the policies of the state as they were in July 1984” (Ponting, 1985, pp. 190-
191). If juries in circumstances such as this were required to ‘abide by their
oath’ against their conscience then their autonomy would be forfeit. As
Ponting himself noted: “a jury left with no practical option but to convict ...
has become a charade” (Ponting, 1985, p. 185). In the Ponting case to require
the jury to convict, when they could not but perceive themselves as fair
arbiters of what is and is not ‘in the State’s interest’ because they themselves
were called to sit effectively in their capacity as members of a public who
legitimate the State during elections, seems itself perverse. 
The above consideration of ‘perverse’ verdicts suggests that they do
not detract from trial by jury. Rather they offer the common-law an internal
mechanism of self-legitimation through ties to the public sphere facilitated
by jury decisions however controversial. If the jury is disallowed the capacity
for rejecting the case of either side then the essential discursive importance
of the capacity to say either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to any validity claim is undermined
in such a way that communicative freedom is denied. The theoretical
capacity to ‘reject’ any validity claim is integral to communicative theory and
its expression in communicative power. If the jury are only to be permitted
to ‘acclaim’ a legally ‘correct’ verdict then their position becomes analogous
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to the ideal ‘automaton’ judge imagined by Weber, (Scheuerman, 1994, p.
71) or that of the denuded ‘voter’ identified by Habermas in Transformation
of the Public Sphere and in “On Political Participation” where the cynical
manipulation of the ‘apathetic majority’ within electorates at election times
produces “ersatz public spheres” subservient to party mass management
(Habermas, 1991, pp. 175-6). It is precisely the capacity of juries to
autonomously reject or accept freely that establishes their authoritative
significance and permits the claim that they underwrite the legitimacy of the
legal system. Denuded of this capacity they are worthless even as
determiners of fact.  
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